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PRESERVING THE  
SECURED CREDITOR’S BARGAIN IN 
CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWN SCENARIOS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits Congress to 
enact federal laws that preempt citizens’ state law rights in bankruptcy 
proceedings.1 When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy 
Code modifies the state law contract rights of his or her creditors. 2 
Although some modifications, such as the automatic stay, may only be 
temporary,3 others permanently inhibit the creditor’s ability to invoke state 
law collection rights against the debtor.4 One of the central policy debates 
in bankruptcy scholarship addresses how much—and to what end—the 
Bankruptcy Code should modify the contract rights of creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings.5 
Creditors whose loans are secured by collateral (secured creditors) 
receive a greater level of protection from the Bankruptcy Code than do 
general unsecured creditors. 6  However, the Bankruptcy Code does not 
guarantee that the contract rights of secured creditors will be preserved 
entirely. One important modification of the rights of secured creditors that 
is permitted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code7 is embodied in the 
“cramdown” provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A). This provision 
permits a bankruptcy court to approve a plan of reorganization even over 
the objection of secured creditors. 8  The three clauses of 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(b)(2)(A) set out the limited circumstances under which a bankruptcy 
court may approve a plan of reorganization that modifies the rights of 
secured creditors without their consent. 9 Thus, it outlines three ways in 
                                                                                                                                
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz’ New Bankruptcy 
Exceptions to State Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 95, 119 (2007). 
 2. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., id. § 362(d) (setting out circumstances under which a bankruptcy court will grant 
relief from the automatic stay). 
 4. See, e.g., id. § 727 (providing for discharge of debt). 
 5. See, e.g., Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to 
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822–25 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditor’s Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1982); Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781 (1987) (“Although this distinction between 
substantive rights and collection rules might seem obvious, it is important to the policy debate, 
which often centers on the degree to which bankruptcy law should ‘rely’ on underlying state 
law.”). 
 6. ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 156 (2008). 
 7. Chapter 11 is the portion of the Bankruptcy Code that provides for the alteration of 
businesses’ debt obligations under the federal bankruptcy laws. Id. at 4. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
 9. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
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which the Bankruptcy Code permits the permanent modification of secured 
creditors’ contract rights in Chapter 11 proceedings. 
Several recent cases have addressed this provision and the degree of 
protection that it affords to secured creditors.10 In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, a Supreme Court decision resolving a circuit 
split between the Seventh Circuit and the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Court 
affirmed the right of secured creditors to credit bid11 at auctions of their 
collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).12 A separate Seventh Circuit 
decision, In re River East Plaza, LLC, struck down a plan that both 
stretched out the repayment period and replaced the creditor’s collateral 
with substitute collateral.13 Ultimately, both courts interpreted the statute in 
a way that gave robust protection to the contract rights of secured creditors. 
Such protection is consistent with an approach to bankruptcy policy 
known as the “creditor’s-bargain” approach. Proponents of this approach 
argue that the purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to solve the collective 
action problem that arises when debtors with multiple creditors default on 
their loans.14 Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a means of ensuring that the debtor’s 
assets will be used in a way that maximizes returns to creditors.15 Thus, the 
Bankruptcy Code should only facilitate a business’s survival if its going-
concern value is greater than its liquidation value.16 Since creditors with 
security interests have bargained for priority in the state law hierarchy of 
repayment, 17  the Bankruptcy Code’s primary objective should be to 
preserve this hierarchy to the extent possible.18 From this perspective, the 
decisions in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and River East Plaza, LLC were 
correctly decided because they rejected plans that upset the state law                                                                                                                                 
 10. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70 (2012); 
In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2012); In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 
F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010); In 
re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) provides secured creditors whose collateral is sold the right to bid at 
the sale of that collateral, and if they successfully purchase the collateral, they “may offset such 
claim against the purchase price of such property.” This practice is known as “credit bidding.” In 
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 302 n.4. 
 12. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. 
 13. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 834. 
 14. Jackson, supra note 5, at 862. 
 15. Warren, supra note 5, at 798. 
 16. A firm’s going-concern value is its value as a functioning business, without the threat of 
liquidation. MICHAEL A. GERBER & GEORGE W. KUNEY, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 94 (3d ed. 
2013). A firm’s liquidation value is the total value of a company’s physical assets. Id. at 93. 
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain approach argue that a business that files under Chapter 11 
should only survive if its survival would increase the amounts received by creditors. Douglas G. 
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 97, 109 (1984). 
 17. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 112. 
 18. Id. at 129. 
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hierarchy of repayment, effectively permitting payments to junior creditors 
before senior creditors were paid in full. 
The Third and Fifth Circuits interpreted § 1129(b)(2)(A) in a way that 
is consistent with another prominent approach to bankruptcy policy, which I 
will refer to as the “optimal loss distribution” approach. Proponents of this 
view note that bankruptcy proceedings invariably result in losses for many 
of the constituencies affected by the bankruptcy,19 and they argue that a 
principal role of bankruptcy is the optimal distribution of such losses.20 
Under this approach, the role of Chapter 11 is to address a broad range of 
social problems caused by business failure. 21  Thus, bankruptcy courts 
should consider not only the interests of secured and unsecured creditors, 
but also the interests of the firm itself, as well as its employees, customers, 
and suppliers.22 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of § 1129(b)(2)(A) in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation in River East Plaza, LLC essentially closed off two 
avenues of discretion through which bankruptcy judges could take such 
considerations into account. 
This Note will examine § 1129(b)(2)(A)’s function in the Bankruptcy 
Code and the policy implications of recent interpretations of this provision. 
Part I of this Note will explore the relevant portions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Part II will summarize the recent decisions interpreting § 
1129(b)(2)(A). Part III will summarize two competing approaches to 
bankruptcy policy that help to illuminate what is at stake in the courts’ 
interpretations of this provision. Part IV will argue that the prevailing 
interpretations are sound and that in the context of § 1129(b)(2)(A), 
preservation of the state law bargains made by secured creditors should be 
the guiding policy consideration.   
                                                                                                                                
 19. Warren, supra note 5, at 785.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 101. 
 22. Warren, supra note 5, at 787–88. 
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I. SECTION 1129(b) AND THE PROTECTION OF SECURED 
CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS 
One of the central elements of the Chapter 11 process is the 
confirmation of the firm’s plan of reorganization,23 which typically results 
in some modification of the debt obligations of the debtor business.24 When 
a business files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay immediately goes 
into effect, preventing all creditors from taking any action to recover their 
debts.25 Creditors are grouped into classes based on the types of claims that 
they hold against the debtor. 26 In Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor is 
given a certain amount of time to propose a plan of reorganization for 
approval by the bankruptcy court (the exclusivity period),27 after which the 
different classes of creditors are permitted to submit their own plans for 
approval.28 
Generally, confirmation of the plan of reorganization is contingent upon 
the consent of each class of creditors. 29 However, in the event that the 
debtor cannot obtain the approval of each class of creditors, the Bankruptcy 
Code provides the debtor with an alternative route to confirmation, which is 
set out in § 1129(b).30 Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the 
bankruptcy court to approve a plan of reorganization without the consent of 
every class of the creditors,31 but it also prescribes strict criteria with which 
such a plan must comply. 32 According to this provision, the bankruptcy 
court should only approve a plan of reorganization if the plan conforms to 
every requirement of § 1129(a) besides the requirement that all creditors 
consent, and as long as such a plan is “fair and equitable, with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not 
accepted, the plan.”33 
The Code goes on to specify the criteria for “fair and equitable” 
treatment with regard to secured creditors in § 1129(b)(2)(A), which sets 
forth the three types of plans that will meet this standard.34 The first two 
clauses indicate specific modifications that a bankruptcy court will permit. 
Under clause (i) (Path One), a court will approve any plan in which the 
secured creditors retain their liens and receive “deferred cash payments 
totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim . . . as of the effective                                                                                                                                 
 23. WARREN, supra note 6, at 134. 
 24. Id. at 147. 
 25. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
 26. WARREN, supra note 6, at 150. 
 27. Id. at 136.  
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 1121. 
 29. Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
 30. Id. § 1129(b). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
 33. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 34. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
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date of the plan.” 35  Secured creditors who retain their liens under this 
provision but who are still not fully secured36 are also permitted, under § 
1111(b), to elect that their claims be treated as fully secured.37 Under clause 
(ii) (Path Two), a court will approve any plan that proposes to pay the 
secured creditor the proceeds from the sale of the collateral, as long as the 
secured creditor is provided the right to credit bid at the sale pursuant to § 
363(k). 38  Thus, §§ 363(k) and 1111(b) are means by which secured 
creditors can protect themselves when reorganization plans are “crammed 
down” under Path One or Path Two without their consent.39 
Clause (iii) (Path Three) sets out a less precisely defined route to 
confirmation. Under this clause, a court will approve any plan that strips a 
creditor of its lien, but Path Three provides for the “realization by such 
[creditor] of the indubitable equivalent” of its claims. 40  The phrase 
“indubitable equivalent” is taken from Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in In 
re Murel Holding Corp., where the court rejected a repayment plan that 
proposed to strip the creditor of its lien and repay the balance of the secured 
debt in a balloon payment ten years after confirmation of the plan.41 Judge 
Hand held that a secured creditor could not be deprived of its collateral 
“unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.”42 However, 
“indubitable equivalent” remains a poorly defined standard, as the In re 
Pacific Lumber Co. court observes: “What measures constitute the 
indubitable equivalent of the value of the Noteholders’ collateral are rarely 
explained in caselaw, because most contested reorganization plans follow 
familiar paths outlined in Clauses (i) and (ii).”43 
Section 1129(b)’s protection of secured creditors in cramdown 
scenarios is an application of what is known as the “absolute priority 
rule.”44 This rule requires that senior creditors be paid in full before junior 
creditors are paid at all, thus creating a hierarchy of rights of repayment.45 
A reorganization plan that adhered to this rule would pay all secured                                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 36. A secured creditor is fully secured when the value of its collateral matches or exceeds the 
value of its claim. WARREN, supra note 6, at 47. A secured creditor is under-secured when its 
claim exceeds the value of the collateral. Id. at 47–48. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506, such creditors’ 
claims are bifurcated, so that a secured creditor has a secured claim equal in amount to the value 
of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the remainder. 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 111(b); see also WARREN, supra note 6, at 157–59 (“The undersecured 
creditor whose claim is bifurcated into its secured and unsecured portions for treatment under the 
plan is permitted to waive its unsecured claims and demand instead full repayment of its total 
claim (11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)).”).  
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“[F]or the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title . . . .”). 
 39. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 41. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935). 
 42. Id. at 942. 
 43. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 44. Id. at 244. 
 45. WARREN, supra note 6, at 156. 
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creditors the full value of their collateral before paying anything to 
unsecured creditors, would pay priority unsecured creditors in full before 
paying general unsecured creditors anything, and would pay general 
unsecured creditors in full before paying equity holders anything.46 Path 
One preserves this principle by requiring debtors to pay “at least the 
allowed amount”47 of the secured creditors’ claims, and secured creditors 
are further protected by the requirement that they retain their liens on the 
collateral. Path Two preserves this principle by protecting secured creditors 
from the danger of undervaluation at sales of their collateral. The extent to 
which Path Three preserves this principle is the issue that is addressed by 
the cases discussed in this Note. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERPRETATION  
OF § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
The proper interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) has been the subject of 
recent litigation in U.S. Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.48 All of 
the cases discussed in this Note address plans of reorganization that strip 
secured creditors of their collateral “in the name of indubitable 
equivalence.” 49 In the circuit split resolved by RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, the debtor reorganization plans all proposed to 
pay the secured creditors the value of their collateral50 as the “indubitable 
equivalent” of their liens on the collateral, without permitting them to credit 
bid at the auctions,51 as required under Path Two.52 In the case of River East 
Plaza, LLC, the debtor’s plan proposed to make deferred payments, as 
provided under Path One,53 while transferring the secured creditor’s lien to 
treasury bonds of supposedly “indubitably equivalent” value.54 Thus, all of 
the debtors in these cases attempted to circumvent the requirements of Paths 
One and Two by claiming that their plans met the indubitable-equivalence 
standard of Path Three. 55  Both the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                                
 46. Id. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70 
(2012); In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2012); In re River Rd. Partners, 
LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2010); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, at 244–45. 
 49. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 829. 
 50. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2067, and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 
599 F.3d at 301, the value was determined by an auction. In Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 238, 
the value was determined by the court. 
 51. See, e.g., In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 645; In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 
599 F.3d at 302; In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 239. 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 53. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 54. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 829. 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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struck these plans down as failing to protect the rights of secured creditors 
to the extent mandated by their interpretations of the statute.56 
A. THE SECURED CREDITOR’S RIGHT TO CREDIT BID  
UNDER § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
The circuit split that was resolved in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC 
concerned a dispute over whether a secured creditor has the right to credit 
bid at a sale of its collateral pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A).57 Path Two of this 
section, the second option for cramdown approval, provides that if a 
secured creditor is to be compensated by proceeds from the sale of his 
collateral, such sale must conform to the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 
363(k),58 which provides that when a reorganization plan involves the sale 
of collateral, the secured creditor must be permitted to credit bid up to the 
value of its claim. 59  In Pacific Lumber Co. and In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC, the Third and Fifth Circuits both found that plans that 
did not permit the secured creditor to credit bid at the sales of their 
collateral could still pass the “fair and equitable” test under the indubitable-
equivalence standard of Path Three. 60  These courts reasoned that the 
proceeds from the sale of the collateral were the indubitable equivalent of 
that collateral, so it did not matter that the sales did not conform to Path 
Two’s requirement that the secured creditor have the right to credit bid at 
the sale.61 
In Pacific Lumber Co., the Fifth Circuit addressed a reorganization plan 
that proposed to pay a group of secured creditors, who had liens on a 
200,000-acre tract of “prime redwood timberland” (the Timberlands), the 
court-determined value of the property.62 The principal debtors in the case 
were Pacific Lumber Company and Scotia Pacific LLC.63 Pacific Lumber 
Company owned and operated a sawmill and power plant.64 Scotia Pacific 
LLC, a special purpose entity wholly owned by Pacific Lumber, owned the 
Timberlands.65 Scotia Pacific gave Pacific Lumber the sole right to harvest 
its timber, which Pacific Lumber then processed and sold. 66  The                                                                                                                                 
 56. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012); In re 
River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 828. 
 57. In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 58. 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 59. Id. § 363(k). 
 60. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 300; In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 247. 
 61. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 318 (affirming the district court’s finding that a 
payment of sale proceeds to the secured lenders was an indubitable equivalent of its secured 
claim); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 236. 
 62. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 236. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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Timberlands were subject to a security interest held by the Bank of New 
York (the Noteholders). 67  At the time that Pacific Lumber filed for 
bankruptcy, Scotia Pacific owed the Noteholders $740 million.68 When the 
debtor’s exclusivity period passed without significant progress on a plan of 
reorganization, the court allowed other creditors to submit plans for 
approval. 69  Marathon Structured Finance (Marathon), one of Pacific 
Lumber’s creditors, submitted a plan that proposed to pay the Noteholders 
the court-determined value of the Timberlands, while stripping them of 
their liens on the property.70 The court ultimately approved this plan.71 
The Noteholders, who believed that the value of the property far 
exceeded the court-determined value and were nevertheless denied the right 
to credit bid as required under Path Two, objected to the plan.72 While the 
secured lenders had a claim in the amount of $720 million, the court valued 
the property at just $510 million.73 Despite the objection of the Noteholders, 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the $510 million that they received satisfied 
the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three.74 The court found that 
the disjunctive “or” in § 1129(b)(2)(A) indicates that the three clauses are 
alternatives and that a plan of reorganization only had to satisfy one 
alternative.75 The Pacific Lumber Co. court reasoned that a plan that met 
the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three did not have to conform 
to the credit-bidding requirement of Path Two.76 The court argued that the 
bankruptcy court’s valuation was reasonably accurate. 77  It went on to 
conclude that payment of the value of the collateral satisfied the 
indubitable-equivalence standard, arguing that “paying off the secured 
creditors in cash can hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the 
value of the Noteholders’ collateral.”78 
In Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit came to a similar 
conclusion. In that case, debtor Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, which 
owned and operated the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Daily 
News, had granted a consortium of lenders a security interest in most of its 
tangible assets. 79  The value of the loan at the time of filing was $318                                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 237. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 249.  
 72. Id. at 245. The court characterizes this transfer of property as a sale, noting that Marathon 
and its subsidiaries “received title to the assets in exchange for this purchase. That the transaction 
is complex does not fundamentally alter that it involved a ‘sale’ of the Noteholders’ collateral.” Id. 
 73. Id. at 238. 
 74. Id. at 245.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 248. 
 78. Id. at 247. 
 79. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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million. 80  After filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, the debtors 
submitted a reorganization plan under which it would pay the secured 
creditors the proceeds from the sale of all of its assets without allowing 
them to credit bid at the auction.81 As the dissent notes, these assets were 
sold to an entity controlled by the current management of the debtor 
business and owned largely by the debtor’s equity holders82 at a price that 
was a fraction of the secured claim.83 The debtors, citing Pacific Lumber 
Co., argued that payment of the proceeds from the sale of the collateral 
satisfied the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three.84 The Third 
Circuit agreed.85 
The court based its decision mainly on its interpretation of the statute 
and congressional intent, but it also touched on public policy 
considerations. The court first reasoned that “the specificity of subsection 
(ii)” does not operate as “a limitation on the broader language of subsection 
(iii).”86 The court also rejected the argument advanced by the objecting 
creditors, as well as the dissent (discussed below), 87  that §§ 363(k), 
1111(b), 1123(a)(5)(D), and 1129(b)(2)(A), taken together, demonstrate the 
intention of Congress to provide maximum protection to secured creditors’ 
interests in their collateral.88 In its policy discussion, the court suggests that 
the purpose of Chapter 11 is not to ensure the greatest possible return for 
secured creditors, but rather to balance the interests of the parties involved: 
“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two 
principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the 
debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests 
by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”89 Elsewhere the court 
states that the Bankruptcy Code, as a whole, is designed “to balance the 
interests of the secured lender and the protection of the reorganized entity” 
and that nothing in the Code suggests that lenders should be “ensure[d] an 
advantageous return on a secured investment.”90 
The dissent of Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC took a different 
approach, which the Seventh Circuit in In re River Road Partners, LLC and 
the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC ultimately followed.91 
Judge Ambro argued that both the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and                                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 302. 
 82. Id. at 319. 
 83. Id. at 302. 
 84. Id. at 304. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 307. 
 87. Id. at 315. 
 88. Id. at 334. 
 89. Id. at 303.  
 90. Id. at 317. 
 91. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70 
(2012); In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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public policy considerations support a different conclusion: that 
reorganization plans providing for the sale of collateral should be governed 
exclusively by the rules of Path Two, which requires that plans proposing to 
sell collateral free and clear of liens must permit secured lenders to credit 
bid at the sale.92 After noting that the statute is ambiguous,93 Judge Ambro 
argues that the structure of the Bankruptcy Code supports his reading of the 
statute by showing how § 1129(b)(2)(A) works in conjunction with related 
provisions. He maintains that § 1123, which governs the content of the plan, 
sets out “three ways in which a plan can provide for the sale of collateral: 
(i) subject to the initial lien retained by the secured creditor, (ii) free of any 
lien, or (iii) after providing a replacement lien on different collateral.”94 
Judge Ambro then argues that these three paths correspond to, and help 
clarify, the three paths to approval under the cramdown provision.95 While 
secured creditors whose collateral is sold under Path Two are protected by 
the credit-bidding requirements of § 363(k), 96  those who keep their 
collateral under a Path One plan are protected from the danger of 
undervaluation by § 1111(b),97 which permits under-secured creditors to 
elect to have their deficiency claims treated as secured claims.98 Together, 
these provisions make up “a comprehensive arrangement enacted by 
Congress to avoid the pitfalls of undervaluation . . . and thereby ensure that 
the rights of secured creditors are protected while maximizing the value of 
collateral to the estate.”99 Congress, according to Judge Ambro, “intended 
to preserve the presumptive right of a secured creditor under applicable 
state law to take the property to satisfy the debt.”100 Judge Ambro also 
advances a policy-based argument that is independent from the issue of 
congressional intent, arguing that the majority’s interpretation of the 
cramdown provision undermines the benefits of secured credit. 101  The 
Bankruptcy Code, the dissent asserts, was not intended to deprive secured 
creditors of “the presumed benefits associated with secured lending.”102 
Judge Ambro also demonstrates that the interpretation of the majority 
and of the Pacific Lumber Co. court is inconsistent with the absolute 
priority rule. He points out that Philadelphia Newspaper’s assets were sold 
to an entity controlled by the current management of the debtor business 
and owned largely by the debtor’s equity holders at a price far lower than                                                                                                                                 
 92. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 332. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 334. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 333. 
 99. Id. at 334. 
 100. Id. at 331.  
 101. Id. at 337. 
 102. Id. 
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the amounts of the secured claims.103 As a result, certain equity holders 
were able to retain control and ownership of the business, even though the 
secured creditors were not paid in full.104 
Both the Seventh Circuit in River Road Partners, LLC and the Supreme 
Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC rejected the reasoning of In re 
Pacific Lumber Co. and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC and followed 
Judge Ambro’s dissent. 105  The Seventh Circuit addressed a jointly 
administered bankruptcy case involving two LLCs that had obtained loans 
to finance the construction of hotels.106 Both companies, River Road Hotel 
Partners, LLC and RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, failed to complete their 
projects and ended up filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.107 Each owed 
about $150 million on their loans, which were secured by liens, at the time 
of filing.108 Both companies submitted reorganization plans that proposed to 
pay the secured parties the proceeds from the sale of substantially all of the 
debtors’ assets, and each claimed to have procured offers of around $45 
million.109 Neither plan permitted the secured creditors to credit bid at these 
sales.110 The bankruptcy court denied confirmation, and both the Seventh 
Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed its decision. 111 The Supreme Court 
noted, however, that while some lower courts—particularly the dissent in 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC—had addressed the policy-based merits of 
credit bidding,112 its decision was based purely on what it took to be the 
plain meaning of the statute.113 
The decisions in Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, 
LLC appeared to give debtor businesses a way of satisfying their debts to 
secured creditors at discounted rates while still holding on to the creditors’ 
collateral. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the absolute 
priority rule. This inconsistency is evident in the facts of Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC, where junior creditors and equity holders were 
essentially permitted to hold on to their collateral—by bidding at the sale—
even though the secured creditors were not paid in full.114 The court in 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC justified this departure from the absolute 
priority rule by arguing that the purpose of Chapter 11 is to strike a balance                                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 302. 
 104. Id. at 301–02. 
 105. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012); In re 
River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 106. In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 643–44. 
 107. Id. at 644. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 645. 
 110. Id. 
 111. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069 (2012); In re 
River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 653. 
 112. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. 
 113. Id. 
 114. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
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between the interests of creditors and those of other constituencies affected 
by the firm’s insolvency.115 In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, the Supreme 
Court rejected this policy-based argument as simply inconsistent with the 
text of the statute, which the Court found to be unambiguous in its 
requirement that secured creditors be permitted to credit bid at the sale of 
their collateral.116 In the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the statute does not 
permit a plan of reorganization that provides for the sale of the secured 
creditor’s collateral to forego the credit-bidding requirement of Path 
Two.117 
B. THE SECURED LENDER’S RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS LIEN  
UNDER § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
In In re River East Plaza, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed a plan of 
reorganization that proposed to stretch out the repayment period, a 
procedure provided for by Path One, without adhering to other requirements 
of Path One.118 The Seventh Circuit thus faced a parallel issue to the one 
faced by the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC. The cases 
culminating in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC addressed plans that used a 
procedure that is provided for in Path Two—sale of collateral free and clear 
of liens—without adhering to the requirement of Path Two that secured 
creditors must be permitted to credit bid. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in 
River East Plaza, LLC addressed a plan that used a procedure that is 
provided for in Path One—deferred payments—without adhering to the 
requirement of Path One that the holders of secured claims retain their 
liens.119 As with the plans in the cases discussed above, the debtors argued 
that this plan satisfied the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path 
Three. 120  The Seventh Circuit, whose decision came down during the 
pendency of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, found that the plan did not 
satisfy the indubitable equivalent requirement of Path Three121 and went on 
to argue in dicta that any plan that provided for deferred payments should 
be required to adhere to the requirements of Path One.122 
The secured creditor in River East Plaza, LLC was LNV Corporation 
(LNV), a mortgagee who was owed $38.3 million by River East Plaza, the 
debtor/mortgagor.123 The value of the property at the time of filing was 
$13.5 million. 124  After River East Plaza filed, LNV elected to have its                                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 303. 
 116. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. 
 117. Id. at 2072. 
 118. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 829.  
 121. Id. at 832.  
 122. Id. at 833. 
 123. Id. at 829. 
 124. Id. 
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under-secured claim treated as fully secured.125 River East Plaza eventually 
proposed a plan in which it would replace LNV’s lien on the property with 
a lien on $13.5 million in substitute collateral in the form of thirty-year 
treasury bonds. 126  It argued that this replacement lien satisfied the 
indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three because “the bonds would 
grow in value in 30 years through the magic of compound interest to $38.3 
million,” thus eventually paying the secured creditor the full amount of the 
secured claim. 127  The bankruptcy court, as well as the Seventh Circuit, 
rejected the plan as failing to satisfy the indubitable-equivalence standard of 
Path Three.128 
The court first argued that a lien on thirty-year treasury bonds was 
simply not the indubitable equivalent of a lien on the property in question, 
noting that thirty-year treasury bonds and real property have totally 
different risk profiles.129 However, the court also reasoned that by paying 
off LNV in thirty-year treasury bonds, River East Plaza was effectively 
using a procedure provided for by Path One—stretching “out the repayment 
of the debt beyond the period allowed by the loan agreement”130—without 
adhering to the requirement of Path One that the secured creditor retain its 
lien on the collateral.131 River East Plaza’s plan did not permit LNV to 
retain its lien on the property, but rather replaced it with a lien on the thirty-
year treasury bonds.132 Thus, the court reasoned that River East Plaza “was 
in effect proposing a defective subsection (i) cramdown,”—defective 
because it did not permit LNV to retain its lien—“by way of subsection 
(iii).”133 
It should be noted with regard to River East Plaza, LLC that the court 
simply held that the plan did not satisfy the indubitable equivalent 
requirement;134 the question of whether or not any plan that stretched out 
payments as provided for in Path One could be approved under Path Three 
was not properly addressed by the court. 135  Judge Posner observed the 
parallel between River East Plaza, LCC and River Road Partners, LCC136 
and argued that any plan that provided for deferred payment should not be                                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012), a secured creditor whose collateral is worth less 
than the total amount of its claim is permitted to elect to have its entire claim treated as a secured 
claim. 
 126. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 830. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 830, 832. 
 129. Id. at 832. 
 130. Id. at 828, 833. 
 131. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 132. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 830.  
 133. Id. at 833. 
 134. Id. at 832.  
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. at 829.  
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approved under Path Three,137 but these observations were not part of the 
holding because the substitution of treasury bonds failed to meet the 
indubitable-equivalence standard anyway.138 
However, the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach in RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel, LLC suggests that it would validate Judge Posner’s 
reasoning and reach the same conclusion regarding Path One as it did Path 
Two. The Supreme Court stated in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC that “the 
‘general language’ of clause (iii), ‘although broad enough to include it, will 
not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with’ in clause (ii).”139 It 
would follow that since plans that provide for deferred payments are 
“specifically dealt with” in Path One, the rules of Path Three “will not be 
held to apply.”140 
Taken together, the holding of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and the 
abovementioned dicta of River East Plaza, LLC amount to a substantial 
limitation on the ability of bankruptcy courts to use the indubitable-
equivalence standard as a means of cramming down plans of 
reorganization. Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC had 
opened up the possibility that bankruptcy courts might be able to use the 
flexible standard of Path Three to permit substantial modifications of the 
rights of secured creditors by allowing equity holders and managers to 
essentially purchase the business from secured creditors at a discount.141 
They exercised such discretion by requiring only that secured creditors 
receive the value of their collateral, as determined by the price produced at 
auction or by the court.142 In contrast, the Supreme Court determined that 
for plans that proceed under Path Two, secured creditors are entitled not 
only to the value of the collateral, but also to the collateral itself if the 
highest bid at auction falls short of their secured claim.143 By requiring all                                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 833. 
 138. Id. at 832. 
 139. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) 
(quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (2012)). 
 140. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2071. 
 141. For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the court permitted a bidder to purchase 
the assets of the business at a lower price than it would have paid if the secured lenders had been 
permitted to credit bid. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, 
J. Dissenting) (“What typically occurs is that, if there are no other bidders, the secured lenders get 
the assets rather than the Stalking Horse Bidder . . . . If credit bidding is denied, however, the 
debtors’ insiders stand to benefit by having more leverage to steer the sale to a favored 
purchaser.”). 
 142. Thus, for example, in Pacific Lumber Co., the court was able to limit the amount of the 
Noteholder’s secured claim to the court-determined value of the Timberlands at the time of the 
case. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 143. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2069. By requiring credit bidding for all 
reorganization plans that proceed under Path Two, the Court effectively permits secured creditors 
to seize their collateral any time the price produced at auction falls short of their secured claims. 
Thus the Supreme Court’s decision ensures that secured creditors have an interest not only in the 
value of collateral as determined by an auction, but also in the collateral itself. Jonathan Azoff, 
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reorganization plans that provide for the sale of collateral to comply with 
the requirements of Path Two, the Supreme Court closed off this potential 
avenue of judicial discretion. In doing so, it reinforced the role of the three 
clauses of § 1129(b)(2)(A) as safeguards of the state law rights of secured 
creditors. 
III. POLICY APPROACHES TO BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Much of the commentary on these cases thus far has approved of the 
prevailing interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) on the ground that it is the 
product of sound statutory interpretation. 144  Commenters argue that the 
interpretations of Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
render Path Two superfluous; 145 that the legislative history supports the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court;146 that depriving secured creditors of 
their right to credit bid at sales of collateral contradicts the intention of 
Congress;147 and that the overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code supports 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation.148 As this Note will demonstrate in Part 
IV, the prevailing interpretations of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are consistent with a 
policy approach to bankruptcy law known as the creditor’s-bargain 
theory.149 The language of the court in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, on 
the other hand, suggests an optimal-loss-distribution approach. 150  These 
theories help to illuminate what is at stake in the courts’ competing 
interpretations, as well as the function that § 1129(b)(2)(A) plays in Chapter 
11 proceedings. 
A. THE CREDITOR’S-BARGAIN THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain approach to bankruptcy take as a 
foundational principle the following proposition: federal bankruptcy law is 
a means of solving the collective action problem that arises when a debtor 
                                                                                                                                
Indubitable Equivalence: A Standard Designed to Protect the Secured Creditor’s Bargain, 21 
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 127, 140 (2012).  
 144. See, e.g., Eric W. Chalut & Blair R. Zanzig, River Road: The Right Road for Selling a 
Secured Lender’s Collateral Under a Chapter 11 Plan, 129 BANKING L.J. 173, 181–82 (2012); 
Ben Logan et al., Seventh Circuit Takes the (River) Road Less Traveled, Creating a Circuit Split 
on the Issue of the Right to Credit Bid in a Sale Pursuant to a Chapter 11 Plan, 7 PRATT’S J. 
BANKR. L. 708, 711 (2011). 
 145. Chalut & Zanzig, supra note 144, at 183. 
 146. Id. at 184. 
 147. Id. at 186. 
 148. Id. at 187. 
 149. See infra Part IV. 
 150. “Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two principal interests: 
facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity, 
and protecting creditors’ interests by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2010). For more detailed summaries of these 
approaches, see Baird, supra note 5; Warren, supra note 5.  
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with more than one creditor goes into default. 151  In a world without 
bankruptcy, each of the creditors in such a situation would have an 
incentive to invoke state collection rights before other creditors in similar 
positions do the same.152 However, engaging in a race to seize all of the 
debtor’s assets may not be in the best interest of the creditors 
collectively.153 Such a race would eliminate the excess of the going-concern 
value over the liquidation value.154 Bankruptcy is an orderly process that 
ensures that the debtor’s assets will be put to their most productive use, 
which may indeed turn out to be liquidation.155 Thus, federal bankruptcy 
law can be justified as a contractual gap-filing measure—a system 
“designed to mirror the agreement one would expect . . . creditors to form 
among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an 
ex ante position.”156 
This reasoning, however, would not apply to creditors with security 
interests, who would otherwise be free to seize their collateral. 157 
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain theory argue that general unsecured 
creditors, who have strong reasons for desiring a collective proceeding,158 
would have an incentive to bargain with secured creditors for such a 
proceeding.159 Since secured creditors would have the right to seize their 
collateral and thereby destroy the debtor business’ going-concern value, 
they would be in the stronger bargaining position and would not settle for 
anything less than what they bargained for outside of bankruptcy; that is, 
they would not settle for anything less than full priority in repayment.160 
Therefore, as one prominent advocate of the creditor’s bargain theory 
argues, “there is nothing ‘unfair’ about recognizing a secured creditor’s” 
full priority in bankruptcy; “[i]nstead, it is exactly the sort of agreement we 
would expect to see negotiated voluntarily” between secured and unsecured 
creditors.161 
Bankruptcy law, according to proponents of this view, should only 
modify the state law hierarchy of repayment “when doing so preserves the 
value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them.”162 Since 
general unsecured creditors have the most to gain from a collective                                                                                                                                 
 151. Jackson, supra note 5, at 861–62. 
 152. Id. at 862. 
 153. Id. 
 154. If the firm’s assets are seized it cannot continue to operate its business, so any value that 
could be generated by a group of assets functioning as a unit would be eliminated. See GERBER & 
KUNEY, supra note 16, at 93–94. 
 155. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 105–06. 
 156. Jackson, supra note 5, at 860. 
 157. Id. at 868.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 121.  
 161. Jackson, supra note 5, at 871. 
 162. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 100. 
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proceeding, they, rather than creditors with security interests, should bear 
the risk of such proceedings.163 A rule that distorted state law priorities by 
diminishing the rights of secured creditors would encourage forum 
shopping, giving equity holders and managers an incentive to enter into 
bankruptcy simply to take advantage of a different set of rules.164 
Additionally, it is worth observing that most of the supporters of the 
creditor’s bargain approach to bankruptcy make no comment on the utility 
or wisdom of the current regime of secured credit.165 They do not favor the 
protection of secured creditors in bankruptcy because protecting secured 
creditors is always good policy. 166 Rather, they argue that the utility of 
affording maximum protection to secured creditors is simply not an issue of 
bankruptcy law; bankruptcy law should preserve state law rights to the 
extent feasible, regardless of what those rights happen to be.167 
B. THE “DISTRIBUTIVE” APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY POLICY 
Another prominent approach to bankruptcy policy, which is evoked by 
the court in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, regards the Bankruptcy Code 
as a means of addressing a broad range of social problems that are the 
inevitable byproducts of business failure. 168  Advocates of this approach 
note that “the statutory scheme” of the Bankruptcy Code “presumes that 
some creditors will not enjoy repayment in full;”169 in other words, losses 
are inevitable. They go on to ask: “How shall these losses be 
distributed?” 170  The bargains made by secured creditors outside of 
bankruptcy are just a few of the many interests that the Bankruptcy Code 
should protect.171 The Bankruptcy Code should also protect the interests of 
individuals and businesses “who are not technically ‘creditors’ but who 
have an interest in a business’ continued existence,” such as employees, 
customers, and suppliers, as well as future tort claimants.172 
Advocates of this view argue that optimal distribution of losses is more 
than a normative theory of how bankruptcy law should function; it is in fact 
how Congress intended the Bankruptcy Code to function: 
Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code . . . serve as reminders 
that Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than 
the immediate problems of debtors and their identified creditors; they 
indicate clear recognition of the larger implications of a debtor’s                                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 129. 
 164. Baird, supra note 5, at 818. 
 165. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 110.  
 166. Id. at 110–11.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 101.  
 169. Warren, supra note 5, at 785.  
 170. Id. at 777.  
 171. Id. at 787. 
 172. Id.  
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widespread default and the consequences of permitting a few creditors to 
force a business to close.173 
Thus, bankruptcy courts should sometimes be permitted to alter state law 
priorities to the extent necessary to reach equitable results. 
IV. THE ROLE OF § 1129(b)(2)(A) IN PROTECTING THE 
SECURED CREDITOR’S BARGAIN 
The limitations on cramdown provisions set out in the three clauses of § 
1129(b)(2)(A)—Paths One, Two, and Three—indicate the extent to which 
Congress intended to protect the bargains made by secured creditors outside 
of bankruptcy.174 Both the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Lumber Co. and the Third 
Circuit in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC suggest that Congress intended to 
permit bankruptcy courts to use Path Three of § 1129(b)(2)(A) to modify 
state law priorities, at the expense of secured creditors, by using the 
indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three as way of approving plans 
that appeared to proceed under different paths. 175  The Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC court evoked the distributive theory in its reasoning: 
“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two 
principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the 
debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests 
by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”176 The interpretation of 
the Supreme Court, on the other hand, limits this discretion by prohibiting 
courts from using the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three for 
any plan that proceeds under Path One.177 In doing so, it reinforced the 
protection of state law priorities in bankruptcy and therefore the bargains 
made by secured creditors outside of bankruptcy. 
This is a sound result because the three clauses of § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
function as safeguards of the state law rights of secured creditors, not as 
means of altering state law priorities. In the implicit bargain between 
secured and unsecured creditors posited by creditor’s-bargain advocates, 
secured creditors would consent to a collective bankruptcy proceeding as                                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 788. 
 174. This is because these three clauses set out the only circumstances under which a secured 
creditor may be forced to accept less than full repayment of its secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 
(2012). The stricter the limitations on approval of such a plan, the more the Code protects secured 
creditors. 
 175. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The use of the word ‘or’ 
in this provision operates to provide alternatives—a debtor may proceed under subsection (i), (ii), 
or (iii), and need not satisfy more than one subsection.”); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 
246 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)) (“Although a credit bid option might 
render Clause (ii) imperative in some cases, it is unnecessary here because the plan offered a cash 
payment to the Noteholders. Clause (iii) thus affords a distinct basis for confirming a plan if it 
offered the Noteholders the ‘realization . . . of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.’”). 
 176. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 303. 
 177. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012). 
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long as the unsecured creditors were willing to bear the risk.178 Creditors 
whose loans are bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims would in fact 
prefer such a proceeding because it would likely result in a greater return on 
the unsecured portion of their debt. 179  Such creditors would consent, 
therefore, to the temporary suspension of their contract rights that facilitate 
a collective proceeding. 180  However, since outside of bankruptcy they 
would have been able to seize their collateral, secured creditors would have 
no reason to consent to less than full priority in repayment.181 From this 
perspective, § 1129, which governs the standards a plan of reorganization 
must meet in order to be confirmed, should afford maximum protection to 
secured creditors because these creditors would presumably bargain for 
robust protections. 
The strict requirements of Paths One and Two of § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
indicate that Path Three should function as a protection of the bargains of 
secured creditors. Secured creditors who are forced into Path One—
deferred payments—are ensured the benefit of their bargain in two ways: by 
the requirements that they retain their liens182 and be permitted to elect 
under § 1111(b) to have their claims treated as fully secured.183 Secured 
creditors forced into Path Two—sale of collateral—are ensured the benefit 
of their bargain by the requirement that they be permitted to credit bid at the 
sale of their collateral.184 Both of these paths protect more than the secured 
creditor’s interest in the value of its collateral at the time the plan is 
submitted; they protect the secured creditor’s interest in the actual collateral 
for which it bargained, which would otherwise be protected under non-
bankruptcy law.185 
The rationale for requiring credit bidding at sales of collateral is to 
ensure that a secured creditor’s interest will not be under-valued, either at 
an auction or by the court,186 and thus to ensure that the secured creditor 
will not be any worse off in bankruptcy than it would be outside of 
bankruptcy. The secured creditor in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
bargained for a lien on the personal property of Philadelphia Newspapers, 
LLC, not for a guarantee of the value that the property would produce at a 
bankruptcy auction.187 There are two problems with transferring the secured                                                                                                                                 
 178. Jackson, supra note 5, at 868.  
 179. Upon the bankruptcy filing, the claims of creditors with security interests in assets that are 
worth less than their claims are bifurcated into “allowed secured claims” and unsecured claims. 11 
U.S.C. § 506; see also WARREN, supra note 6, at 46–49. 
 180. For a discussion of the benefits of the bankruptcy process for both secured and unsecured 
creditors, see Jackson, supra note 5, at 858–72. 
 181. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 106.  
 182. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 183. Id. § 1111(b). 
 184. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 185. Azoff, supra note 143, at 140.  
 186. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 332 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J. Dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 301. 
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creditor’s lien from the property itself to the proceeds from the sale of the 
property. First, the highest bids at bankruptcy auctions typically fall well 
below the fair value of the property,188 as was the case in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC. 189  Likewise, bankruptcy judges may undervalue 
collateral to the detriment of secured creditors, as was the case in Pacific 
Lumber Co.190 Second, the value of property, real property in particular, 
fluctuates over time; if collateral is sold while the market is down, secured 
parties will suffer losses. As the dissent argues in Philadelphia Newspapers, 
LLC, the right to credit bid is meant to protect secured creditors from the 
danger of undervaluation.191 It also prevents junior creditors from engaging 
in maneuvers, such as those engaged in by the equity holders in 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, which effectively permit them to benefit at 
the expense of senior creditors. 
Likewise, the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three is best 
understood not as a grant of discretion to the court, but rather as a safeguard 
of the bargains made under state law by secured creditors.192 Commenters 
have observed that the standard articulated in Murel is a demanding one, 
and that “Judge Hand framed indubitable equivalence in reference to the 
creditor’s expectations.”193 Courts have also observed that “the ‘fair and 
equitable’ requirement does not look toward protection of debtor interests, 
but rather toward protection of dissenting creditor interests.”194 
Thus, the “fair and equitable” standard is best understood as an 
application of the absolute priority rule, not an exception to it. The courts in 
Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC use the indubitable-
equivalence standard as a means of altering state law priority of payment in 
order to balance the interests of all of the parties involved.195 The result is 
that junior creditors have an incentive to use bankruptcy simply as a means 
of taking a larger slice of the repayment pie than they would have taken 
outside of bankruptcy, and equity holders have an incentive to use 
bankruptcy simply as a means of retaining control of a company at a 
discounted price. This incentive structure is likely to prevent the firm’s 
assets from being put to their highest value use.196 As Baird and Jackson                                                                                                                                 
 188. Leonard P. Goldberger & Harvey L. Tepner, A Guide for Acquiring Businesses in 
Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 521, 522 (2001). 
 189. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 332. 
 190. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 191. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 332. 
 192. Azoff, supra note 143, at 140. 
 193. Id. at 133. 
 194. In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 195. See, e.g., In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 303 (“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code strikes a balance between two principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and 
rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests by 
maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”). 
 196. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 109.  
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warn, junior parties will “systematically make decisions that ignore the real 
costs of keeping the firm together.”197 
The facts of Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC provide a useful illustration 
of the adverse effects of using the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path 
Three to alter state law priorities in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. In 
that case the court approved a plan of reorganization that proposed to sell 
the secured creditor’s collateral without permitting the secured creditor to 
credit bid and to use the proceeds from the sale as the “indubitable 
equivalent” of the collateral. 198  As the dissent notes, Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC’s assets were sold to an entity controlled by the current 
management of the debtor business and owned largely by the debtor’s 
equity holders199 at a price that was a fraction of the secured claim.200 The 
dissent also notes that “the debtor’s strategies were designed ‘not to 
produce the highest and best offer.’”201 In other words, the debtor’s insiders 
were able to purchase substantially all of the assets of the company, free 
and clear of liens, at a price much lower than the creditors’ secured claim. 
Junior creditors (the current equity holders) benefitted at the expense of 
senior creditors (the secured lenders). Such a result gives equity holders an 
incentive to enter into bankruptcy simply to take advantage of a different set 
of rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The three cramdown paths of § 1129(b)(2)(A) were designed to ensure 
secured creditors the benefits of their state law bargains; accordingly, 
protection of the state law priority of secured creditors should be the 
guiding policy consideration for courts interpreting this subparagraph. This 
is not to say that the enhancement of the collection efforts of secured 
creditors is or should be the objective of every provision in the Bankruptcy 
Code. The procedural rules that facilitate a collective bankruptcy 
proceeding are designed to further the interests of the firm, and thereby 
those of other constituencies that would benefit from the firm’s survival, 
such employees and suppliers, at the temporary expense of secured 
creditors. However, the rules governing the substance of the plan of 
repayment, of which § 1129(b)(2)(A) is one, should not give preferential 
treatment to parties that would not enjoy such treatment outside of 
bankruptcy. While the “debtor in process of reorganization . . . is given 
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many temporary protections against the normal operation of law . . . , the 
reorganized debtor is supposed to stand on his own two feet.”202 
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